We consider the problem of individual manipulation under incomplete information, i.e. the whole preference profile is not known to voters. Instead, voters know the result of an opinion poll (the outcome of a poll information function  , e.g. a list of scores or a set of winners). In this case, a voter has an incentive to misrepresent his preferences ( -manipulate) if he knows that he will not become worse off and there is a chance of becoming better off. We consider six social choice rules and eight types of poll information functions differing in their informativeness. To compare manipulability, first we calculate the probability that there is a voter which has an incentive to  -manipulate and show that this measure is not illustrative in the case of incomplete information. Then we suggest considering two other measures: the probability of a successful manipulation and an aggregate stimulus of voters to manipulate which demonstrate more intuitive behaviour. We provide results of computational experiments and analytical proofs of some of the observed effects.
Introduction
When a society needs to make a collective decision, one should apply a procedure aggregating individual preferences into a social choice. There are many aggregation procedures, but none are ideal, since all of them have some undesirable properties. One of these properties is the vulnerability of an aggregation rule to manipulation by voters. We say that a voter has an incentive to manipulate if he can achieve a better voting result by misrepresenting his preferences. Of course, it is better when all voters want to declare their sincere preferences, otherwise, a collective choice would be biased and, consequently, would not reflect the preferences of a society. Unfortunately, all social choice rules which have at least three possible outcomes are either manipulable or dictatorial [Gibbard, 1973] , [Satterthwaite, 1975] , [Gӓrdenfors, 1976] . This result is called GibbardSatterthwaite theorem.
In this regard, it is of interest to compare social choice rules in their vulnerability to manipulation. The most intuitive approach is to calculate the probability of manipulation for different rules and choose a rule which minimizes this probability. This probability of manipulation is also called Nitzan-Kelly's index, since it was first used in [Nitzan, 1985] and [Kelly, 1988] . There are a number of studies investigating social choice rules from this perspective. [Kelly, 1988] suggests considering the minimal number of manipulable preference profiles for a social choice rule satisfying some predefined properties. This research direction is continued in [Fristrup and Keiding, 1998 ], and a series of studies [Maus et al., 2007a [Maus et al., , 2007b [Maus et al., , 2007c [Maus et al., , 2007d .
In [Kelly, 1993] the manipulability of the Borda rule is compared with the manipulability of different classes of rules satisfying some predefined properties. An extended statistical investigation of individual manipulability of social choice rules using Monte-Carlo experiments was done in [Aleskerov and Kurbanov, 1999] and continued in [Aleskerov et al., 2009 [Aleskerov et al., , 2011 [Aleskerov et al., , 2012 . The manipulability of approval rule and a family of k-approval rules was studied in [Peters at al., 2012] both theoretically and using simulations. The same probabilistic approach was applied to studying coalitional manipulability [Lepelley and Valognes, 2003] , [Pritchard and Wilson, 2007] , [Slinko, 2006] .
In all these articles it is assumed that voters know each other's sincere preferences, i.e. public information is reliable and complete. This is a rather strong assumption, but helps to simplify the comparative analysis of manipulability of social choice rules. Intuitively, incomplete information would make manipulation more difficult and rarer.
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A more realistic assumption is that voters know some information from opinion polls held before voting. This information could be represented, for example, by preferences of a subset of voters, or a list of candidate scores, or the winner of the election. A mathematical model for the manipulation under poll information is presented in [Reijngoud and Endriss, 2012] . The authors show which rules and which types of public information make manipulation possible or not and study voter response to the repeated poll information.
Using this model, we investigate to what extent social choice rules are susceptible to manipulation, calculating the share of preference profiles with at least one voter having an incentive to manipulate. One of our results is that social choice rules are manipulated almost everywhere in this model if we consider manipulation with information about the winner of the election. Having this, we propose two other indices of manipulability under incomplete information. The first is the proportion of preference profiles where at least one voter has an incentive to manipulate and this manipulation is successful. The second takes into account the stimulus level of each manipulating voter, which is calculated as the probability of success. We show that these measures are more representative than the first one when studying manipulability under incomplete information.
The model

Definitions and notations
Let N denote a finite set of voters, aP bP c , and when alternatives are tied, we choose the one which dominates all others by T P (has a higher priority). In this case we sacrifice neutrality to obtain resoluteness.
Another way is to extend voter i 's preferences in such a way that he can compare all subsets of alternatives. There is a number of possible ways to do this [Karabekyan, 2009 ], but we restrict our attention to lexicographic preference extension methods (PEMs), Leximin and Leximax [Pattanaik, 1978] . We denote the extended preference relation of voter i by i EP ( i EI -extended indifference relation) and say that
In other words, with the Leximin method we assume that it is important for a voter to avoid worse alternatives, while under Leximax, to seek better alternatives.
The alphabetic tie-breaking rule may also be interpreted as an extended preference relation.
Poll Information Functions and Manipulation
We use the model for poll information functions introduced in [Endriss and Reijngoud, 2012] . Assume that before voting, an opinion poll is carried out which reveals voters' sincere preferences, P . Thus, profile P represents complete and exact information about preferences of all voters. However, for some reasons not all the information is available to voters. A poll information function (PIF) ( ) P  puts into correspondence to a preference profile any piece of information about this profile. We consider the following types of PIF.
1. Profile:
2. Anonymous profile (ballot): 
Given two PIFs  and 
and a voter i N  who has an incentive to  -manipulate in P .
Conditions for the susceptibility of social choice rules with alphabetic tie-breaking to  -manipulation were found in [Reijngoud and Endriss, 2012] (a generalization of the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem). The aim of this paper is to reveal the degree of manipulability of SCRs under different PIFs. The first measure considered is the simple probability of manipulation, i.e.
how often at least one voter has an incentive to misrepresent his preferences. The sample space 8 consists of all preference profiles, that is, they are assumed to appear equally likely (the Impartial Culture assumption). 
Social Welfare Functions
In this section we introduce formal definitions for SWFs in the study. We need to specify what to consider as "scores" (Score-PIF) and how a social ordering is calculated as a scalar product ( , ) , ( , )
-Plurality:
 Run-off procedure. It has two stages:
[1] The plurality score is calculated for each alternative. A first-stage vector of scores is
and the procedure terminates. Otherwise, procedure moves on to the stage [2].
[2] Two alternatives with maximal number of scores are chosen;
If there are ties, they are broken according to the alphabetical tie-breaking rule T . Then a second-stage vector of scores is calculated:
The alternative with the higher score is considered better,
. Both of them are better than all other alternatives,
a Pa . All other alternatives are considered as indifferent,
The output of Score-PIF is

Single Transferable vote (STV)
. This is a multi-stage procedure, which we define in an iterative form.
[0]
: 1
, ( , )
a Ia , the procedure terminates.
arg min( ( ))
[3]
The output of Score-PIF is 
Ranking
R P I
  is defined as usual: 
Another useful observation: if  is at least as informative as   and F is strongly computable from
F is also strongly computable from   -images. Now we study computability and the binary relation "being at least as informative as" for six SWFs from the previous section and illustrate them with directed graphs.
For all scoring rule
For the Runoff procedure and STV rule, Positions-PIF is dropped from this chain, since information provided by ( ) v P is not enough to compute the winner. Consequently, scoring rules are computable from  -images for all PIFs of this chain. Obviously,
for any rule. However, all the considered positional social choice rules are not computable from MG-PIF (see Fig.1-3 ).
For the Borda rule WMG-PIF contains all the necessary information to compute the winner and is at least as informative as Score-PIF, 
However, a majority graph does not provide sufficient information for a voter to compute the winner for any way of voting, while a weighted majority graph does.
Further we make use of strong computability. The PIFs, for which SWFs are strongly computable from  -images, are denoted by circles on Fig. 1 
Manipulability
Theoretical results
In this Section we answer the question of how often there exists a voter which has an incentive to misrepresent his preferences. First, we provide some theoretical results and then compare the manipulability of rules using different PIFs by conducting computational experiments.
It is of interest to know how incomplete information influences manipulability: does it reduce the probability of manipulation compared to complete information case? The first result shows under which PIFs the degree of manipulability does not differ from manipulability under Profile-PIF. 
and the result ( , )
, then in all preference profiles P where there is a voter who has an incentive to  -manipulate, there is also a voter (the same one) who has an incentive to Profile-manipulate, and vice versa. And other direction, if a voter has an incentive to Profile-manipulate in P , then it has an incentive to  -manipulate. Consequently, the number of manipulated preference profiles will be the same under  -PIF and Profile-PIF, and
An especially interesting case is the vulnerability of SCF to manipulation under Winner-PIF, the least informative non-zero information function. The following result reveals the asymptotic susceptibility of the most popular social choice rule, the plurality rule to Winner-manipulation. . Thus, for a voter having the winning alternative on the last position in preferences voting for his second-best alternative is never worse than voting sincerely for a .
Now consider the set of preference profiles with a single-valued outcome. The proportion of such profiles tends to 1 as n goes to infinity. 3 If ties are broken, then the winner is always unique.
Our aim is to find the share of profiles where at least one voter has the winning alternative as their worst preference, because all these profiles will be manipulable.
Let us consider the set of preference profiles with n voters, where alternative 
Thus, in a set of preference profiles with a given distribution of votes 1 ( ,..., ) m p p the share of profiles with at least one voter having a particular alternative as their worst preference tends to 1 as n goes to infinity. Consequently, in the union of profile sets for different vote distributions (the set of profiles with a unique winner), this proportion also tends to 1 as n goes to infinity. Therefore, (1), (2) ( ) 1 (1), (2) ( ) 1
, (1) ( ) 1 MG P    (a cyclic majority relation).
Let us consider the first case. Without loss of generality, assume that There could also be two types of cyclic majority graph:
MG P
 . In all 12 profiles producing a cyclic majority relation the outcome of the Borda rule is where voter ( ) i P   makes the result better by using this strategy. If there is such a strategy, then the voter has an incentive to  -manipulate. We mark this preference profile P and all profiles of grows for plurality (here experiments illustrate the result of Theorem 2), Borda, Runoff and STV.
Manipulability is weakly increasing along the chain of PIFs (Fig. 4) To sum up, the susceptibility of SCRs to  -manipulation is not sufficient: when a rule is computable from  -images, then it is almost always susceptible to  -manipulation. Then we studied the proportion of preference profiles with at least one voter who has an incentive to  -manipulate. This gave us an interesting result: the manipulability measured this way in most cases increased compared to the complete information case.
Manipulation success and stimulus to manipulation
Having the results of the previous Section, we try to extend the analysis of manipulability under incomplete information by introducing two other measures. As we have seen, the probability that at least one voter would deviate could be high enough, but not in all situations this leads to success (achieving the goal of manipulation). Thus, the second index measures the probability that in a preference profile there is a manipulating voter and his manipulation is successful in this preference profile.
Let 2 ( , , , )
I m n F  be the probability that in a preference profile randomly chosen from
there is at least one voter who has an incentive to  -manipulate under SWF F and his manipulation is successful in this preference profile. Formally,
Another observation is that the cardinality of the voter's information set could be quite large, while the share of profiles where manipulation is successful could tend to 0. This explains the high values of 1 I under incomplete information. In order to take this into account we suggest measuring the stimulus to manipulation for each voter. This function would reflect the level of willingness to manipulate, which is assumed to be proportional to the probability of success. Let us denote this by ( , , ( ) 
||
, if voter has an incentive to -maniulate, ( , , ( )) || 0, otherwise.
Instead of a binary measure of manipulability for a preference profile as in 1 I , we set a number from the interval [0, 1] , calculated as the maximum stimulus among all voters having an incentive to  -manipulate in this preference profile. Index ( , , , Proof. Suppose, voter i has an incentive to  -manipulate in P by voting i P . Since F is strongly computable from  -images, then ( ) ,
Consequently, 
The share of preference profiles with a unique plurality winner where at least one voter has an incentive to Winner-manipulate tends to 1 (as shown in Theorem 3), but the stimulus to manipulation of this type tends to 0. . Thus, the share of preference profiles where manipulation is successful is even less than under Leximin and Leximax PEM, and consequently, it also tends to 0. Q.E.D. In most cases the index of stimulus to manipulation 3 I is lower for Winner-PIF than for Rank-PIF (and in case of alphabetic tie-breaking 3 I for 1Winner-PIF is the lowest). This shows that the lack of information does not increase the manipulability measure, which takes into account the willingness of voters to manipulate. The most significant difference between 1 I and 3 I is for 1Winner-PIF with alphabetic tie-breaking: more than 0.75 for 10 n  . Finally, if a social choice rule is not computable from p -images, as in the case of WMG-PIF, then the indices of manipulation success and stimulus to manipulation are very low, and with an increasing number of voters can be regarded as negligible. 
Computational experiments
Conclusion
We studied the vulnerability of social choice rules to voter manipulations under incomplete information using the model of opinion polls. We realized that the fact of susceptibility of SCRs to  -manipulation is not enough and considered the probability of such manipulation to compare SCRs and the influence of different PIFs on manipulability.
It turned out that many rules are susceptible to  -manipulation not only when they are strongly computable from  -images, but even when they are not computable from  -images. For example, information about a weighted majority graph allows for manipulation in about 40% of preference profiles. The values of the first manipulability measure with information about the winner grow very fast and approach 100% in some cases. Another interesting observation is that less information leads to greater manipulability for many rules.
Thus, we also could not be satisfied with the analysis of the probability of  -manipulation, because it does not show what is behind the high values of the manipulability measure. The second manipulability measure we considered counts only preference profiles where manipulation is successful. For all parameters used in experiments we revealed that incomplete information does not influence the probability of manipulation success for the plurality rule when it is computable from  -images.
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The third manipulability index measures the stimulus of voters to manipulate. For the plurality rule, the greater the growth of the manipulation probability, the less the aggregate stimulus to manipulation. In asymptotics, for an infinite number of voters, while the probability of the manipulation of the plurality rules is 1, the willingness of voters to manipulate is zero. For the PIF which does not allow to compute the winner, this index gives the least values among other PIFs.
The analysis of manipulation under incomplete information made in this study allows us to view the problem from different perspectives. Importantly, it shows that a formal approach like the calculation of manipulation probability has its drawbacks: the values are high, but we do not see what kind of manipulation takes place. Another, more subjective, criterion may be needed which shows that manipulation is not such a dramatic problem as seemed earlier.
